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their status with institutions that were under no legal obligation 
to allow them to continue. Now, however, tenured faculty mem-
bers have the legal right to continue indefinitely in their tenured 
appointments. 
From the point of view of an academic institution, the elimi-
nation imposes two types of costs. First, to the extent that some 
faculty members at an institution postpone their retirements, the 
flow of new faculty into an institution will diminish. Fewer new 
hires means fewer faculty with fresh perspectives and ideas. 
Fewer new hires also reduces an institution's ability to diversify 
its faculty along gender, racial, and ethnic lines. And fewer new 
hires can make it difficult for an institution to shift faculty re-
sources into exciting new areas of inquiry. 
Second, retirements generate funds for salary increases for 
continuing faculty, because most full professors are replaced by 
lower-paid assistant professors. The difference between the salary 
of a retiring full professor and that of his replacement can be dis-
tributed to other faculty members in the form of salary increases. 
Postponement of retirements at an institution reduces the 
amount of such funds available in a year, and the institution 
must either make up the difference with other funds or reduce 
the salary increase that it provides for its faculty. 
Cornell s Response to the End of Mandatory 
Retirement 
AS AN ECONOMIST WHO STUDIES THE ECONOMICS OF 
higher education, I worried that the end of mandatory retire-
ment at my institution, Cornell University, might create serious 
problems. When I accepted the position of vice president for 
academic programs, planning, and budget at the university, I did 
so with the understanding that this would be one of the first is-
sues I would address. In fall 1996, the provost and faculty senate 
appointed a joint faculty-administrative committee to deal with 
the issue, with me as chair. 
Our committee suspected that many Cornell faculty mem-
bers might not want to retire for fear of breaking their ties to 
the university. In my own case, Cornell's former president had 
been so effective in protecting my academic freedom when sev-
eral members of the university's board of trustees tried to block 
my promotion to full professor that I had developed a deep 
loyalty to Cornell.1 My attachment to Cornell is not unique. 
Many faculty members at the university consider themselves 
lucky to live in an idyllic college town and work at an institu-
tion with such excellent students, colleagues, and research facil-
ities. The turnover rate of tenured faculty at Cornell has histor-
ically been low; only about 1.5 percent of the tenured faculty 
leave the university each year for reasons other than retirement. 
This attachment to the university exists despite the fact that 
faculty salary levels at Cornell are not among the highest in the 
nation. 
Adding to the committee's doubts about our colleagues' eager-
ness to retire were studies conducted before the end of manda-
tory retirement that suggested that the elimination would mainly 
affect major research universities, where faculty members are 
often so tied to their work that they cannot conceive of leaving 
their positions unless compelled to do so.2 As a major research 
university, Cornell was cognizant of this prediction and worried 
what the change would mean for it.3 
Cornell s Retirement Plans 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY IS UNIQUE AMONG MAJOR AMERI-
can research institutions in that it is a hybrid of private and 
publicly assisted colleges. Six of the colleges located on its 
Ithaca, New York, campus are private colleges that charge tu-
itions comparable to those at other selective private institu-
tions. Faculty in these colleges may participate in the defined-
contribution retirement programs of either TIAA-CREF or 
Fidelity. Under a defined-contribution program, the em-
ployer contributes a specified percentage of the faculty mem-
ber's salary each year into a fund, which is then invested to 
provide benefits for the faculty member in retirement. The 
fund "belongs" to the faculty member, and as long as the 
return on the assets in the fund is positive, defined-
contribution pension plans do not give faculty strong 
economic incentives to retire. 
The faculty at Cornell's publicly assisted colleges—Agricul-
ture and Life Sciences, Human Ecology, Veterinary Medicine, 
and Industrial and Labor Relations—are covered by benefit 
programs provided to the State University of New York cam-
puses by the state of New York. They have a choice of partici-
pating in a defined-benefit retirement plan sponsored by the 
state or a TIAA-CREF defined-contribution plan. 
Defined-benefit retirement plans provide retired faculty 
members with an annual benefit that usually depends on 
their salary and years of service. Such plans offer incentives 
for retiring, because the later one retires, the fewer the years 
that the retirement benefit payment will be paid. Besides 
that, the plans often specify maximum-benefit percentages, 
which, after some point, eliminate much of the increase in 
annual retirement benefits that comes from working an 
extra year. 
The defined-benefit plan for Cornell's state-assisted col-
leges, for example, provides a re-
tiring faculty member with an 
annual retirement benefit equal ^ . 
to 2 percent of the average of \Jti a v e r a g e , 
the individual's three highest t h e d a t a S U g g e S t 
annual salaries multiplied by the t h a t FaCllltV 
individual's years of service. So a m p m K p r c ckt 
faculty member who retired ^ --
after working thirty years would v ^ O m e i l r e t i r e 
receive an annual pension bene- W e l l 111 a d v a n c e 
fit equal to 60 percent of the av- Q £ t h e i r 
erage of her three highest annual C A W I H - I # H 4 I 
i • A i i r» OC VC11L1C HI 
salaries. Annual pension benefits - . - -
are, however, "capped" at 75 b i r t h d a y s , SO, 
percent of salary, so that after a t first g l a n c e , 
th irty-seven and a half years of e l i m i n a t i n g 
service to the university addi- m a n d a t o r y 
tional years or service will not . J 
increase a faculty member's an- r e t i r e m e n t 
nual benefit (although increases S e e m s n o t 
in salary will).
 t o ^y^ J^J a 
It is easy to build retirement • • ^
 o n 
incentives into denned-beneht - v f 
salary programs by offering indi- U l c i r r e t i r e m e n t 
viduals credit for extra years of behavior. 
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service if they retire early. The University of California system 
did just that recently in several of its programs. It is much 
more difficult and expensive, however, to build effective re-
tirement incentives into defined-contribution programs, be-
cause additional contributions made by employers to encour-
age retirement are subject to federal and state income taxes in 
the year the contributions are made. Over time, most faculty 
in the state-assisted colleges at Cornell have elected to partici-
pate in the optional defined-contribution program, which has 
made it difficult for the university to provide cost-efficient re-
tirement incentives for these faculty members and for their 
colleagues in the private part of the university. 
An Aging Faculty 
LIKE MANY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, CORNELL 
was confronting a "graying" faculty by the mid-1990s. Changes 
in the age distribution of the faculty and the tight financial envi-
ronment in which all of the university's colleges were operating 
had come together to restrict the flow of new faculty into the 
university. The total number of new tenure-track faculty ap-
pointments in the university had peaked at 108 in 1987-88 and 
then fallen to only 48 in 1995-96. Put another way, in the ag-
gregate, new faculty hires at Cornell fell by almost 60 percent 
between 1987-88 and 1995-96. 
Historically, Cornell has grown its own "stars," concentrating 
its faculty hiring at the assistant-professor level and providing 
good opportunities for these new assistant professors to flourish 
and receive tenure. This strategy is designed to build a faculty of 
individuals committed to the institution, as well as to their own 
discipline, and willing to devote time to doing things that bene-
fit the institution as well as their own careers. Over the last fif-
teen years, about 70 percent of all new faculty at the university 
have been appointed at the assistant-professor level. In spite of 
this emphasis on young faculty, the decline in the overall num-
ber of new hires has led to a decline in the number of younger 
faculty at Cornell. More than 15 percent of all faculty were 
under thirty-five in 1982-83, but by 1996-97, the under-thirty-
five group had fallen to around 5 percent. 
How did eliminating mandatory retirement influence the ages 
at which Cornell faculty retire? The mean and median ages at re-
tirement for faculty in the private part of the university fluctu-
ated without any discernible trend between 1982-83 and 
1993-94, but since then the ages have increased by about three 
years. The comparable numbers for faculty in the state-assisted 
units show virtually no change. On average, the data suggest that 
faculty members at Cornell retire well in advance of their seven-
tieth birthdays, so, at first glance, eliminating mandatory retire-
ment seems not to have had a large impact on their retirement 
behavior. 
But means or medians can be deceiving. Although many fac-
ulty members retired well before their seventieth birthdays be-
tween 1982-83 and 1996-97, about a third of the retirees from 
Cornell's private colleges left at seventy or older (retirees could, 
of course, be older than seventy only after January 1, 1994, 
when the law changed). Indeed, in February 1998, twenty-seven 
faculty members who were seventy or more were still actively 
employed in the private part of the university. (These faculty 
members had turned seventy after January 1, 1994, but had not 
retired as of February 1998.) Over the same period in the state-
assisted units, about 11 percent of the faculty members who re-
tired did so at seventy or older; seven faculty members in this age 
group were still active in the units in February 1998. 
Some of these faculty members are now employed under part-
time phased retirement agreements. Under these agreements, 
faculty members legally give up their tenure and promise to re-
tire within five years in exchange for part-time positions that pay 
them proportionate salaries but full-time benefits (including 
health insurance and retirement contributions). The inescapable 
conclusion is, however, that the abolition of mandatory retire-
ment is leading to an increase in retirement ages for Cornell fac-
ulty. To the extent that faculty retire later, this reduces the flow 
of new faculty into the university. To take a simple numerical 
example, suppose a university employs 1,750 faculty. If each 
professor begins working at the university at age thirty, and each 
retires at sixty-five; an average of fifty faculty will be hired each 
year. If, however, faculty retire at seventy instead of sixty-five, 
annual hiring of new faculty will fall by one-seventh to about 
forty-three. 
Most faculty members nearing retirement at Cornell are 
highly productive, and the prospect that many will postpone 
retiring means that the university will continue to benefit from 
their skills. These extra benefits must, however, be balanced 
against the costs to the institution that delayed retirement 
brings: limitations on new faculty hires and on the pool of 
money available for faculty salary increases. 
Retirements, as I have already noted, generate funds for fac-
ulty salary increases because most retiring full professors are re-
placed by lower-paid assistant professors. The difference between 
the salaries of the retirees and their replacements can be distrib-
uted to other faculty members in the form of salary increases. 
Calculations by my staff suggested that before the end of manda-
tory retirement, the typical professor could, in a given year, get a 
salary increase of more than 1.3 percent from the pool of funds 
created by replacing retiring full professors with new assistant 
professors—even though no new monies were available for salary 
increases that year. But if the full professors delayed retirement 
by five years, the annual increase would fall to close to 
1 percent. 
Changing Expectations 
IN 1996-97, 35 PERCENT OF THE CORNELL FACULTY (INCLUD-
ing me) had been hired before 1978, when the mandatory retire-
ment age for faculty was raised from sixty-five to seventy; all of 
us began our careers at Cornell with the expectation that we 
would retire no later than age sixty-five. The Cornell retirement 
and benefits packages, as well as Cornell's tenure system, were 
designed with that retirement age in mind. Twenty-seven per-
cent of all faculty in 1996-97 were hired between 1978 and 
1987, when the law eliminating mandatory retirement for fac-
ulty was enacted (although it did not become effective until 
1994). All of these faculty began employment at Cornell with 
the expectation that they would retire no later than age seventy. 
Thus most faculty at Cornell at the time our committee began 
its deliberations had received the opportunity to remain em-
ployed for longer than they or the university expected when they 
were hired. 
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I assumed somewhat naively that these faculty members would 
think not only of the new rights to longer careers that eliminat-
ing mandatory retirement had granted them, but also of the 
costs it had imposed on the university. Most in fact did. But 
some faculty members told me that the change in the law had ef-
fectively granted them indefinite tenure and that they had no 
intention of retiring unless the university offered them an expen-
sive buy-out arrangement. At least one faculty member also stip-
ulated that he would not contemplate retiring until the univer-
sity guaranteed it would replace him with someone whom he 
approved in his narrow specialty. While one would hope that in 
making retirement decisions, faculty who have had long careers 
with an institution would think about the institution's welfare as 
well as their own, that did not occur uniformly. 
Cornells New Policy 
IT TOOK A YEAR AND A HALF OF DELIBERATIONS, REVISIONS, 
and consultations with faculty, administrators, and trustees be-
fore the committee's recommendations were finally adopted by 
the university in May 1998.5 The provost had instructed the 
committee to rule out the option of expensive buy-out plans. He 
did so because evidence from other campuses suggested that such 
plans are rarely cost-effective when the primary retirement sys-
tem is a defined-contribution program. For one thing, buy-outs 
do not appear to induce a substantial number of retirements. Be-
sides that, most faculty members at Cornell retire before age sev-
enty, and any plan that paid them to retire before seventy would 
amount to paying them for doing what they would have done 
anyway. Hence the plan the committee recommended and the 
university adopted contained no buy-outs. 
It did, however, have four key components to help faculty 
members and their departments plan for retirement. The first 
deals with financial planning over the life cycle. The committee 
and the administration did not want a lack of financial resources 
to constrain faculty members who wished to retire at seventy or 
younger. In the absence of funds to increase the university's con-
tribution to faculty retirement plans, assisting faculty with finan-
cial planning over their life cycles is a cost-efficient way to help 
them make informed investment decisions about the assets in 
their retirement accounts. 
A sad, but true, example helps to illustrate the importance of 
financial-planning assistance. One of the highest-paid faculty 
members in the university realized as he neared the age at which 
he might consider retiring that he did not have sufficient re-
sources to retire. When he first joined the university, he had al-
located all of the contributions to his retirement account to 
TIAA, which is invested mainly in bonds and income-producing 
properties; he had never thought about changing this allocation. 
Because he had allocated none of his contributions to CREF or 
other stock-market-related options, he had missed out on all of 
the large stock-market gains of the previous decade. Faculty 
members who are intellectual giants in their chosen areas of en-
deavor are not necessarily experts on financial matters, and pro-
viding them with some simple financial advice can have a 
high payoff. 
During our deliberations, we discovered that only about half 
of Cornell's faculty participated in tax-deferred supplementary 
retirement accounts. And only a minority of the faculty mem-
Riculty 
members 
who care 
about their 
institution 
should want 
to help it cope 
with the 
transition that 
their leaving 
will cause. 
bers who did participate con-
tributed the maximum amount 
legally permitted. These ac-
counts allow participants to in-
vest in assets using before-tax 
dollars; the assets earn returns 
that are not subject to federal 
and state income taxes until 
withdrawals are made after re-
tirement. Hence Cornell's pol-
icy recommends that faculty re-
ceive regular information on the 
benefits of tax-deferred savings 
and be informed that, because 
of the power of compound in-
terest, savings early in the career 
will have a greater impact than 
savings later in the career on wealth at retirement. 
The second component of Cornell's new policy views retire-
ment from the perspective of the academic unit and urges faculty 
to discuss their intentions with chairs or college officials as they 
approach retirement. Recruiting replacement faculty at an insti-
tution like Cornell often takes several years, and the ability of an 
academic unit to plan for its future depends on its having a sense 
of when its faculty members plan to retire. Faculty members 
who care about their institution should want to help it cope with 
the transition that their leaving will cause. The policy recom-
mends that if faculty members do not initiate a discussion about 
their retirement plans on their own, departmental or college ad-
ministrators should do so. At the same time, the policy stresses 
that retirement is a voluntary decision protected under federal 
and state law, and it urges all discussions about retirement to 
recognize this fact. 
The third main part of the policy is a program to allow faculty 
to "phase" into retirement. As I mentioned earlier, the university 
had a long-established program for phased retirement, which al-
lowed faculty in the private part of the university to move to 
half-time appointments for up to five years, during which time 
they received half salary but full benefits (including health insur-
ance and retirement contributions). Upon signing an agreement 
to enter into the program, the faculty member voluntarily agreed 
to give up tenure and retire at the end of five years or less. The 
plan dated back to when the mandatory retirement age was 
sixty-five, and it needed to be revised to take into account the 
new law and faculty in the state-assisted colleges. 
The committee recommended continuing the program but 
specified that seventy should be the maximum age at which fac-
ulty members could opt for it. We felt that the maximum age, 
which is permissible under recently enacted federal legislation, 
was needed to give faculty members an incentive to begin the re-
tirement process voluntarily before reaching seventy. Some fac-
ulty leaders urged the provost to allow faculty members to move 
to half-time status without giving up tenure, but he rejected this 
idea because of the concern that it would delay, rather than en-
courage, retirement and hinder departments in planning for re-
placements for retiring faculty. 
The fourth, and probably most important, part of the policy 
relates to improving the status of emeritus professors. The goal 
was for faculty to see becoming an emeritus professor as a nat-
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ural and desirable stage of their career, rather than as being "put 
out to pasture." The policy includes providing small research 
stipends to emeritus professors for five years, guaranteeing them 
shared office space, and increasing the opportunities for them to 
do part-time teaching. It also allows them to maintain all of the 
privileges of active faculty members, including supervision of 
graduate students and the ability to submit grant applications 
requesting salary support from external sources. On top of that, 
the policy explicitly provides for the representation of emeritus 
professors in the faculty senate and calls for enhanced status and 
funds for the emeritus professors' association. It also encourages 
emeritus professors to get involved in volunteer activities on the 
campus and in the local community. Many emeritus professors 
had complained that the title "emeritus" had stigmatized them. 
So, following a policy developed at the University of California, 
Berkeley, a new rank of "graduate school professor" was estab-
lished, and emeritus professors were made eligible for this rank 
for renewable five-year periods upon a vote of the faculty mem-
bers in their fields. 
Lessons for Other Institutions 
IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL HOW SUCCESSFUL CORNELL'S POL-
icy is going to be in helping the university maintain an adequate 
flow of new faculty and a sufficient pool of funds for salary in-
creases for continuing faculty. But we do have indications that, 
at least in several areas, the program is providing real benefits to 
Cornell's present and retired faculty members. 
One of my responsibilities as vice president for academic pro-
grams, planning, and budgeting was space planning. So I negoti-
ated for, and obtained, an office for the Cornell Association of 
Professors Emeritus (CAPE). This office was needed to symbol-
ize the importance of emeritus professors to the university and to 
provide a work space for CAPE. The office will soon be moved 
to a suite adjacent to the dean of the faculty, who is an elected 
faculty leader, to stress the connection of the emeritus faculty to 
the faculty as a whole. 
It has been a joy for me to watch the speed with which CAPE 
has begun working to help both emeritus and nonemeritus fac-
ulty. The association has compiled a list of volunteer opportuni-
ties on and off campus and developed information on finances 
and other matters that faculty need to know as they contemplate 
retirement. Indeed, the emeritus professors have begun to as-
sume the role of peer-retirement counselors. An emeritus profes-
sor lecture series has even been started on campus and in a local 
retirement community. 
In a program initiated by my wife, who is an assistant superin-
tendent of the Ithaca City School System, several groups of Cor-
nell retirees (staff as well as faculty) now serve as volunteers in 
our local schools. The impact of their efforts on Ithaca's elemen-
tary school students, and the influence of the students on them, 
is extraordinary. Few families have three generations living in 
Ithaca, so benefits besides academic progress accrue from having 
volunteers in local schools. The students serve as surrogate 
grandchildren for the retirees, and the retirees as surrogate 
grandparents for the students. 
Not every element of the new program evokes enthusiasm. 
For example, although compensation for part-time teaching by 
emeritus faculty is negotiated individually, it is usually lower 
than the professors would have received on a per-course basis if 
they had not retired. Some faculty have threatened to postpone 
retiring because they view the compensation as inadequate. 
I have tried to persuade colleagues who have raised this issue 
with me that they should consider their cut in salary as analo-
gous to the gifts that alumni make to Cornell each year. Cer-
tainly, those of us who have been fortunate enough to spend 
most of our academic lives at institutions like Cornell should feel 
extremely lucky to have had such wonderful careers. While many 
of us lack the financial wealth that the university's alumni often 
have, we do have extraordinary amounts of human capital. Our 
time as emeritus professors gives us an opportunity to donate 
that capital to the university, whether it be in the form of advis-
ing graduate students, teaching, serving on committees, or con-
tinuing our research. The reduced payments that emeritus pro-
fessors get for teaching do not seem "out of line" when viewed in 
this way. 
Perhaps Cornell's situation is unique. Its faculty members, like 
their peers at other research universities, are motivated mainly by 
the love of what they do, not by money. In addition, Cornell rep-
resents the type of institution to which faculty members can easily 
become attached. Its location in a small community in which fac-
ulty can easily walk or drive to campus made it possible and im-
portant for us to design a mutually beneficial program that enables 
emeritus professors to remain vigorous parts of the community. 
A successful program must offer retiring professors the oppor-
tunities to continue to do what they love. Thus the effectiveness 
of Cornell's response to the end of mandatory retirement will 
depend on whether the institution shows that it truly values 
emeritus professors and creates an environment in which they 
can remain professionally active. Whether Cornell's policies can 
be applied to other institutions is unclear. An institution that 
differs from Cornell in having many faculty members who are 
not as eager to continue their research, as satisfied with their re-
lationship with the institution, or as interested in continuing to 
reside near it may need to stress different things than we did. 
What seems clear, however, is that no policy will prove effective 
unless both faculty and administrators are actively involved in 
developing and implementing it, as they were at Cornell. & 
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